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ABSTRACT
PORTFOLIO CONSIDERATIONS IN AUTOMOBILE PURCHASES: AN
APPLICATION TO THE JAPANESE MARKET
Naoki Wakamori
Elena Krasnokutskaya
This dissertation empirically studies demand complementarities in automobile pur-
chases using newly collected Japanese household-level panel data, Keio Household Panel
Survey. It is motivated by the observation that approximately one third of Japanese house-
holds own more than one automobile and they tend to hold particular combinations of
products, which cannot be captured by the prevalent single choice model in this literature.
The dissertation develops a structural model where consumers can purchase up to
two dierentiated products, where I allow for exible complementarities which depend
on consumer attributes and product characteristics. In the model, rms set the prices for
their products, given other rms' pricing strategies and consumer demand. I then estimate
the model using two types of data: micro-level data on household automobile purchasing
decisions and macro-level data on market share.
My estimates suggest that strong complementarities arise when households purchase
a combination of one small automobile and one regular-sized automobile, or one small
automobile and one minivan as their portfolio. The estimates also indicate that households
are more likely to purchase two automobiles as their numbers of earners increase or if they
v
are located in rural areas.
Ignoring such portfolio eects would lead to biased counterfactual analyses. For ex-
ample, my results suggest that a policy proposal of repealing the current tax subsidies for
eco-friendly small automobiles would decrease the demand for those automobiles by 12%,
which is less than the 17% drop predicted by a standard single discrete choice model.
Similarly, model simulations indicate that the presence of positive portfolio eects
signicantly inuences rms' pricing behavior: rms potentially have incentive to use a
mixed bundling strategy when the number of products and rms in the market is small.
vi
Contents
Acknowledgements iv
1 Introduction 1
2 Related Literature 6
2.1 Modeling Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.1 Random Coecient Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.2 Multiple-Discrete Choice Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.3 Combining Macro and Micro data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Automobile Industry and Related Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3 The Model 12
3.1 Dierentiated Product . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2 Household Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2.1 Utility from Single Automobile Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2.2 Portfolio Eects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2.3 Choice Probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.3 Firm Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4 Estimation 22
4.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.2 Objective Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.2.1 Macro Market Share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.2.2 Covariance between Households Attributes and Product Character-
istics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2.3 Covariance between Observed Characteristics for Two Automobiles . 26
4.2.4 The GMM Estimator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
vii
4.2.5 Variances of Parameter Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5 The Data 30
5.1 Dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.1.1 Keio Household Panel Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.1.2 New Motor Vehicle Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.1.3 Automotive Guidebook: Micro Data for Products . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.2 Deciding on a Choice Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.3 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.4 Data Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.4.1 Decision Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.4.2 Alternative Data Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.4.3 Potential Market Share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6 Estimation Results 39
6.1 Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.2 Model Fit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7 Counterfactual Analyses 47
7.1 Repeal of Tax Subsidies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
7.1.1 Details of Tax Subsidies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
7.1.2 Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
7.2 Mixed Bundling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
7.2.1 Competitive Mixed Bundling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
7.2.2 Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
8 Conclusion 65
A Description of Variables 67
A.1 Household Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
A.2 Product Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
B Technical Appendix 69
B.1 Substitution Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
C Computational Appendix 71
viii
List of Tables
2.1 Extending Direction of Automobile Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1 Mean and Std. Dev. of Product Characteristics for Each Category . . . . . 37
5.2 List of Automobile Makers and Product Lineups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.1 Estimated Parameters of the Demand Sides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
6.2 Estimated Parameters for Portfolio Term . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6.3 Estimated Parameters for Supply Side . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6.4 Model Fit 1 - Households Purchasing One Automobile . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6.5 Model Fit 2 - Households purchasing two automobiles . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7.1 List of Taxes Associated with Automobile Purchases . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
7.2 Annual Automobile Tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
7.3 Example of Tax Subsidies for a Selected Kei-car, MOCO . . . . . . . . . . . 57
7.4 Tax Elimination Eect on Automobile Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
7.5 Tax Reduction Eects for Selected Kei-cars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
7.6 Tax Reduction Eects for Selected Minivans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
7.7 Tax Elimination Eect on Producer Surplus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
7.8 Welfare Implication in Million Dollars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
7.9 Mixed Bundling Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
A.1 Description of Variables for Household Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
A.2 Description of Variables for Automobile Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . 68
ix
List of Figures
5.1 Alternative Modeling of Consumers Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.1 Change in Units Sold for All Automobiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
7.2 Change in Units Sold for Regular Cars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
7.3 Change in Units Sold for Minivans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
7.4 Change in Units Sold for Manufacturers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
x
Chapter 1
Introduction
In many dierentiated product markets, such as the markets for automobiles and personal
computers, consumers often purchase more than one product. They typically choose several
dierent products rather than multiple units of an identical product, assembling a portfolio
that meets their specic needs. For example, a married couple with three children might
purchase one compact sedan to commute to work on the weekdays and one minivan to go
camping on the weekends. This illustrative example suggests that, the utility from such a
portfolio of products might not simply be the sum of the products' individual utilities due
to complementarities between products, though most of the existing literatures ignore such
eects.1 In this paper, I call the extra utility that a household derives from purchasing
combinations of products the \portfolio eect."
This dissertation develops an empirical framework to estimate a market equilibrium
model that incorporates portfolio eects in consumer demand and applies the framework
to the Japanese automobile market. The Keio Household Panel Survey (KHPS), a newly
1In single-discrete choice models, all choices are restricted a priori to be perfect substitutes.
1
collected household-level survey, suggests that of the households who purchase more than
one automobile, more than half purchase at least one car from a category of small cars called
kei -cars.2 The popularity of kei-cars is partially due to government tax subsidies that were
introduced in the 1960's to make small cars more aordable for Japanese households, and
that currently promote ownership of environmentally-friendly small cars. In recent years,
there has been discussion about a potential repeal of these tax subsidies. The opposition
claims that the demand for fuel ecient kei-cars would dramatically decrease. If there is a
positive portfolio eect between kei-cars and other types of cars, however, those households
who purchase one minivan and one kei-car under the current tax scheme might maintain
their portfolio by purchasing more aordable minivans and kei-cars after the subsidies are
repealed. As a consequence, the demand for kei-cars might not decrease as sharply, i.e., the
environmental eect of the repeal of tax subsidies for small automobiles might be limited.
The modeling framework developed in this dissertation extends previous models consid-
ered by Berry et al. (2004) (hereinafter referred to as \micro-BLP") and Gentzkow (2007).
In my model, there are two types of agents - consumers and rms. Consumers choose to
purchase one or two cars from a set of dierentiated cars, or to purchase nothing. Each
automobile is characterized by a bundle of characteristics, such as horsepower and fuel
eciency, and consumers derive utility from these characteristics. When they purchase
two cars, consumers may potentially derive an extra utility, the portfolio eect, depending
on household attributes and product types. Motivated by the data, I introduce portfolio
eects that vary by car categories. I divide the set of automobiles into three categories,
2A kei-car is the smallest automobile classication in Japan. To be classied as a kei-car, an automobile
must have an engine displacement of less than 660cc, and its exterior width, height, and length must be
less than 4.86ft, 6.56ft, and 11.15ft, respectively.
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i.e., kei-cars, regular cars and minivans, and assume that consumers obtain the same port-
folio eect for any set of two automobiles that belong to the same respective categories.
Consumers maximize utility by consuming automobile and non-automobile goods subject
to a budget constraint. The supply side of the model follows Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes
(1995); oligopolistic multi-product rms simultaneously set the prices for their products
to maximize prots, taking into account the pricing strategies of other rms.
To estimate the model, I draw on various sources of information including individual-
level data on purchasing decisions, macro-level data on market shares, and data on product-
level characteristics. KHPS provides household-level data on annual automobile purchas-
ing decisions, as well as basic household demographics, for 4,005 representative Japanese
households. This micro-level dataset enables me to relate household attributes to the char-
acteristics of purchased products and to identify the value of joint ownership of dierent
categories of automobiles. New Motor Vehicle Registrations provides aggregate annual
market share data, which helps to improve the accuracy of estimated model parameters. I
construct the product characteristics dataset using Automotive Guidebook, which lists all
available automobile models in Japan every year.
The model predicts choice probabilities for each household given its attributes and
yields the pricing rst order conditions for rms. Following the estimation procedure
suggested by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) (hereinafter referred to as \BLP") and
micro-BLP, I estimate the model by matching four sets of simulated moments to their
data analogues: the macro market share of each product, the covariance between automo-
bile characteristics and household attributes for those who purchased one automobile, the
covariance between automobile characteristics for those who purchased two automobiles,
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and the rms' rst order conditions. I minimize the distance between the predicted and
empirical moments for the last three sets of moments derived from the micro-data, subject
to the rst set of moments derived from the macro-data matches exactly.
The estimation results show that positive portfolio eects exist between kei-cars and
regular cars, and also between kei-cars and minivans. The estimates also indicate that
households are more likely to purchase two automobiles as its number of earners increases
and if they are located in rural areas. These results immediately suggest the following
questions: Would ignoring portfolio eects lead to overestimation of the impact of repealing
tax subsidies for small automobiles?
I use the estimated model to simulate the eect of eliminating the current tax subsidies
for small automobiles. The results suggest that the total demand for kei-cars would de-
crease by 12%. To explore the importance of allowing for portfolio eects, I also estimate
a standard single choice model, micro-BLP model. It predicts that the demand for kei-cars
would decrease by 17%. This dierence of about 5% can be accounted by the portfolio
eect. My model also predicts that sales for cheaper minivans would increase under the
new tax policy, while sales for expensive minivans would decrease. This can be explained
by the fact that some households highly value a combination of one one kei-car and one
minivan, and those households would purchase one kei-car and one relatively cheap minivan
to maintain benets from their portfolio under the new tax policy.
The simulation results also show that the prots of rms that primarily manufacture
kei-cars would decrease by an average of 3.8%. Four out of seven manufacturers fall into
this category. The remaining manufacturers would have, on average, 2.5% higher prots.
One rm, which produces only one model of kei-car among its 28 models, would increase its
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prot by 3.3%. Industry-wide prots for Japanese automobile makers would not change.
This result reects two osetting eects; an increase in prot from households purchasing
slightly larger and more expensive cars than kei-cars, and a negative eect on prot from
households purchasing no automobiles under the new tax scheme.
Given the nding of strong positive portfolio eects between kei-cars and minivans and
between kei-cars and regular cars, I address a question of interest to rms and government;
I consider how prots would change if rms used a bundling strategy in their pricing, and
how social welfare would change as a consequence. This simulation is performed for a
hypothetical market with two rms. In practice, I choose two rms and two products for
each rm that were found to have strong portfolio eects and allow these two rms to
price bundles of products as well as individual products. The simulation results show that
there is an incentive for rms to use a mixed bundling strategy. Compared to the case
where rms are banned from bundling, both the single-car prices and the bundle prices are
higher.
5
Chapter 2
Related Literature
The modeling framework of this dissertation builds on earlier empirical studies on esti-
mating discrete-choice demand and multiple-discrete choice models, because consumers
in my model can choose at most two dierentiated products from the choice set, taking
into account the interaction between selected two products. Furthermore, this dissertation
also builds on a literature on using both micro- and macro-level data. As an application
point of view, this dissertation is related to literature on automobile industries and related
policies, such as subsidies for purchasing new automobiles and gasoline taxes, because the
Japanese automobile taxes work to promote purchase of particular types of automobiles.
Consequently, this chapter reviews literature on discrete-choice demand models and
multiple-discrete choice models as a modeling framework, and automobile industry and
related policies.
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2.1 Modeling Framework
2.1.1 Random Coecient Models
Estimating the demand functions is one of the central issues for empirical economists,
because it enables us to study the sources of market power as in Bresnahan (1987), and
BLP, measures the welfare eect from new products as in Petrin (2002), and answer many
policy related questions as in Goldberg (1995). One of the most common approaches in
this literature is characteristics approach, applied to dierentiated product demand models
by Lancaster (1971) and McFadden (1974), which considers products as bundles of charac-
teristics, and consumers maximize their utility derived from these product characteristics.
Among them, BLP-type random coecient model is one of the most attractive and con-
venient approaches, because it does not require micro-level data and allows us to have plau-
sible substitution patterns by exploiting characteristics approach and introducing product
specic unobservable terms. Suppose there are two products which have similar observed
product characteristics but the market shares for those two products are totally dier-
ent. Then, product specic unobservable terms can absorb the dierence between market
shares, and it allows us to have plausible substitution patterns. Due to these advantages,
BLP-type random coecient models are widely applied to estimate the dierentiated prod-
uct demand in various industries, such as Nevo (2001) for the ready-to-eat cereal industry,
and Rysman (2004) for the Yellow Pages, and so on.
The existing literature, however, is limited to analyzing a single discrete choice, i.e.,
decision makers can only choose one alternative from the choice set, because of diculties
in identication and computation. There are several exceptions, which are described in
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the following sections.
2.1.2 Multiple-Discrete Choice Models
This paper also contributes to the literature on estimating multiple-choice demand mod-
els. There are three approaches in the majority of the literature. Each approach needs
to assume two dierentiated products ex-ante are either substitutes as in Dube (2004)
and Hendel (1999), independent as in Augereau, Greenstein and Rysman (2006), or com-
plements as in Manski and Sherman (1980). Gentzkow (2007), who studies the comple-
mentarities among print and online newspapers, allows for more exibility in the sense
that the two dierentiated products could be substitutes, independent, or complements.
This paper extends Gentzkow (2007)'s method, allowing the portfolio eect to depend on
household attributes in order to obtain exible complementarity patterns, which are likely
of importance in the empirical setting. Therefore, this dissertation builds on both Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) and Gentzkow (2007).
This dissertation is not the rst article which is the hybrid of random coecient models
and multiple-discrete choice models. For example, Fan (2010) studies the U.S. newspaper
industry using a multiple-discrete choice model. In her model, consumers can choose
to subscribe to at most two newspapers, and the utility from the second newspapers is
discounted by a constant number which is smaller than one, implying that two newspapers
are substitutes.1 Another article by Hendel (1999) measures the returns of computerization
in rms by allowing rms to choose multiple units of dierentiated computers to meet each
employer's specic demands and aggregate their needs, implicitly assuming that computers
1Discounting the second newspaper's utility means that interaction term between rst and second news-
papers should be negative, when the utility from the second paper would not be discounted.
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are substitutes. In my model, however, I would like to have exible substitution patterns,
which depend on household attributes. Therefore, I take Gentzkow (2007)'s modeling.
2.1.3 Combining Macro and Micro data
This empirical study is also related to the literature of dealing with micro- and macro-
level data when both datasets are available. In many occasions, empirical economists face
some diculties in having individual-level data. That is why the BLP method is very
convenient because it enables us to estimate the demand functions from only macro-level
market share data. However, I have both levels of data, and would like to utilize both
sets of information. As Imbens and Lancaster (1994) investigate and applied by Petrin
(2002) and m-BLP, I construct the objective function from micro-level data and maximize
it subject to the moment condition from macro-level data. In that way, I exploit both
datasets.
Moreover, there is an advantage of using both types of datasets. Fan (2010) uses only
macro-level market share data, while Hendel (1999) uses only micro-level market share
data. Thus, macro-level data enable us to identify product specic unobservable terms
and coecient associated with random coecient terms, while micro-level data enable us
to identify combination specic unobservable terms and portfolio eect terms.2
2.2 Automobile Industry and Related Policies
Recent increasing environmental concerns have lead to a renewed policy focusing on auto-
mobile markets. One stream of literature analyzes the policy of promoting the retirement
2See Chapter 4 for more detailed discussion.
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of old automobiles by subsidizing the scrappage of old atuomobiles and the purchase of
new automobiles, such as Adda and Cooper (2000), Alberini, Harrington and McConnell
(1995), Chen, Esteban and Shum (2010), Hahn (1995), and Schiraldi (2009). For example,
Adda and Cooper (2000) and Schiraldi (2009) construct consumers' dynamic programming
problem to describe the replacement behavior of automobiles.
In their models, however, one of the key features in automobile market is ignored:
multiple-ownership. For example, suppose the government implements the policy of subsi-
dizing the scrappage of old automobiles and the purchase of new eco-friendly automobiles.
Consider a household which owns two automobiles, one of which is eligible to be subsidized
while the other one is not, and is considering purchasing two new automobiles. In such a
case, the household might replace those two cars with one eco-friendly automobile being
subsidized and another larger displacement automobile. With a subsidy, the household
may purchase even larger automobile that they would have in the absence of the subsidy.
In this way, even in dynamic models, multiple-purchasing considerations might be impor-
tant. And, ignoring those portfolio considerations, we might have biased counterfactual
analyses. Therefore, in order to fully consider the automobile demand, both dynamic and
Table 2.1: Extending Direction of Automobile Demand
Static Dynamic
Single-purchase BLP(1995) Schiraldi (2009)
Multiple-purchase Wakamori(2011)
multiple-ownership aspects should be taken into account. However, such a dynamic and
multiple-ownership model will be computationally expensive and data requirement will
be demanding. As a result, this dissertation is devoted to understand the mechanism of
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multiple-ownership problem, and thus this empirical study complements the literature on
dynamic demand models.3
Another literature on the eects of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Stan-
dards is also closely related to my paper. CAFE Standards are U.S. regulations intended
to improve automobile fuel eciency by charging penalty fees to automobile manufactur-
ers when the average fuel economy of their annual eet of automobile production falls
below the standard. There are many papers that analyze CAFE standards using vari-
ous approaches. These include Bento et al. (2009); Austin and Dinan (2005); Goldberg
(1998); and Gramlich (2010). CAFE standards can be viewed as an implicit tax on large
automobiles and a subsidy for eco-friendly small automobiles. However, the Japanese tax
subsidies create a more direct consumer incentive to purchase eco-friendly automobiles.
This empirical study complements aforementioned literature.
3Another reason why this dissertation focuses on multiple-ownership is to avoid an endogeneity problem.
See Chapter 5 for more detailed discussion.
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Chapter 3
The Model
3.1 Dierentiated Product
In this chapter, I describe my model. Consider a dierentiated product market with two
types of agents: consumers and producers. Each dierentiated product is indexed by j,
j = 0; 1; 2;    ; J , and expressed as a bundle of characteristics, such as horsepower and
fuel eciency. Let pj and xj denote the price and other characteristics of product j. As
a matter of convention, let j = 0 denote the outside good, i.e., purchasing no products.
In the following sections, I describe consumers' and producers' maximization problems,
respectively.
3.2 Household Behavior
Let i = 1; 2;    ; N denote the individual households. Each household is characterized by
its observed attributes, (yi; zi), where yi denotes the income of households and zi denotes
other household attributes such as such as family size, age of the household head, number of
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kids and so on. In my model, I assume that each household purchase up to two automobiles.
Let di = (d1; d2) denote an automobile purchase decision for household i, where each dk
specify the product, i.e., dk 2 f0; 1;    ; Jg for k = 1; 2. The households maximize their
utility by choosing automobile consumptions and level of non-automobile consumption
goods, C. Namely, each household i solves the following maximization problem;
max
C;(j;l)
uc(C)uai (j; l) s.t. C + p
c
j + p
c
l  yi;
with
uc(C) = C;
log(uai (j; l)) = uij + uil +  (j; l; z
c
i ) + "i;(j;l);
where pcj is a price for automobile j that consumers face, u
a
i is the utility from automobile
consumption which could be dierent for each household even if they choose the same auto-
mobiles, and uc is the utility from non-automobile consumption. This functional form is a
Cobb-Douglas utility function in automobile and non-automobile consumptions. I assume
that the log of utility from automobile consumption as a sum of the following components;
(i) utilities from each automobile consumption, uij and uil, (ii) an interaction term between
two automobiles which I call the portfolio eect,  (j; l; zci ), and (iii) idiosyncratic individ-
ual preference shock, "i;(j;l), assumed to be independent of the product characteristics and
of each other. In the following subsections, I explain the utilities from each automobile
consumption and the portfolio eect term, after describing the automobile taxes in Japan.
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Automobile Prices In Japan, three types of taxes are levied for purchasing automo-
biles.1 First of all, based on acquisition prices, consumers must pay an automobile acqui-
sition tax, depending on the engine displacement of automobiles, i.e.,
1;j =
8>>>><>>>>:
0:03; if j's displacement is less than 660cc,
0:05; otherwise:
Second, consumers also must pay an automobile weight tax, which is approximately $55
for any kei-cars per year, and $79 for every 0.5 tons for other automobiles.
2;j =
8>>>><>>>>:
55; if j is a kei-car;
79bxj;1=500c; otherwise;
where xj;1 is the weight of automobile j measured in kilo grams.2 Finally, depending on
the engine displacement of the purchased automobile, consumers must pay an automobile
tax or kei-car tax, denoted by 3;j . This tax is $90 for any kei-cars, while the automobile
tax is summarized in Table 7.2.
In summary, if the price for automobile j is pj , consumers eventually need to pay the
following price,
pcj(pj ;  ) = (1 + 1;j) pj + 32;j + 33;j ;
because consumers must pay these taxes for rst three years at the time of the purchase.
1See Chapter 6 for more details.
2A denition of the oor function is bxc = maxfn 2 Zjn  xg
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3.2.1 Utility from Single Automobile Consumption
For each automobile consumption, each household derives the following utility;
uij = xj0i + j =
MX
m=1
xjmim + j ; (3.1)
with
im = m +
RX
r=1
zpir
o
mr + 
u
mim; (3.2)
where xj = [xj1;    ; xjM ] and j represent the observed and unobserved characteristics for
product j respectively, i = [i1;    ; iM ] denotes household i's valuation for each product
characteristic, zpi = [z
p
i1;    ; zpiR] and i represent observed and unobserved household
attributes assumed to follow standard normal distributions. Furthermore, I interact these
evaluations for each automobile characteristics with household attributes. o and the u
denote the coecient for the observable and unobservable household attributes.
One key feature of this specication is that each household is able to have a dierent
valuation for each product. Moreover, even if the household characteristics are the same, it
is still possible to have dierent valuations for each product. For example, as the household
size increases, the households valuation of seating capacity might increase. This trend
will be captured by o. However, it still possible to have dierent valuations due to the
unobserved household heterogeneity, im, which is the last term in equation (3.2).
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3.2.2 Portfolio Eects
The most straightforward way to capture portfolio eects between two automobiles is
by dening them pair-wise, i.e., dening them for each possible combination of j and
l. It is, however, almost impossible to estimate these pair-wise portfolio eects due to
diculties in computation and identication. Thus, I introduce category-wise portfolio
eects, motivated by the data showing that households are interested in having a particular
combination of two dierent types of automobiles, such as one sedan and one minivan, not
one specic sedan and one specic minivan. I categorize automobiles into three mutually
exclusive sets, the set of kei -cars denoted by K, the set of regular cars denoted by R, and
the set of minivans denoted by M. Then, I assume that the portfolio eect is the same,
for all automobiles in the same category, respectively, i.e.,
 (j; l; zci ) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
 KK ; if (j; l) 2 (K K)
 KR; if (j; l) 2 (K R) [ (RK)
 KM ; if (j; l) 2 (K M) [ (MK)
 RR; if (j; l) 2 (RR)
 RM ; if (j; l) 2 (RM) [ (MR)
 MM ; if (j; l) 2 (MM)
0; otherwise.
Potentially, there are other possible ways to categorize automobiles. For example, I can
categorize them by engine displacement, horsepower, or mileage. This classication is be
16
viewed as the passenger capacity of the automobiles, because the average passenger capac-
ity of kei-cars, regular cars, and minivans are four, ve, and seven respectively. Moreover,
it is also possible to include the dierence of capacities between the two automobiles, in
the portfolio eect. However, this method oers too little variation, because the seating
capacities do not vary enough and even taking the dierence there is insucient variation
to estimate the coecient. That it why I introduce the category-wise portfolio eect in
this particular estimation.
Moreover, I impose the following parametric assumption on the functional form of the
portfolio eect,  , for each combination r;
 r =  0 + r +
LX
l=1
rlz
c
il; for r = KK;KR;KM;RR;RM;MM
where  0 = 0zci0 is the constant utility shifters of owing two automobiles for all r, r is
the combination specic unobserved term for combination r, zci = [z
c
i1;    ; zciL] are the
household i's attributes that aect the portfolio eect but not the base utility of each
product ui(j), and r = [1r ;    ; Lr ] are the coecients for the household characteristics.3
The role of the rst term, the  0, captures the eect of having two automobiles, because
this term does not depend on any particular combination of automobiles. The combination
specic unobserved terms play a similar role to that of the unobserved characteristics
for each product, the j . The last term captures any patterns of holding a particular
combination which might be driven by a particular households attributes. For example,
if the household includes any children, the choice probabilities for combinations which
3This is necessary for the identication condition. To achieve identication, the household attributes
included in the portfolio eect are dierent from the household attributes included in the random coecient
parts.
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include one minivan are typically high. It captures such trends.
3.2.3 Choice Probabilities
Substituting (3.2) into (3.1) and putting them together with the original maximization
problem, the utility of household i choosing j can be given by the following simple equation:
uij = xj0i + j
=
MX
m=1
xjm m + j| {z }
j=j()
+
MX
m=1
xjm
"
RX
r=1
zPir
o
mr + 
u
mim
#
| {z }
ij=ij(xj ;;i;zi;)
= j + ij :
For notational simplicity, let j denote the mean utility derived from product j which is
the same for every household, and ij = (xj ;;i; zi) denote the remaining part except
"ij . When a household chooses the outside option, it will obtain 0 = 0 and i0 =  ln(yi).
Assuming that " follows a Type I extreme value distribution, the probability of choosing
product j and l conditional on household i's attributes, all product characteristics, and
parameter values is given by
Pr[di = (j; l)jzi; yi;i;x;p; ;]
=
1
Fi
exp[j + ij + l + il +  log(yi   pj   pl) +  (j; l; zi)]; (3.3)
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where Fi is dened as
Fi = exp[ log(yi)] +
JX
k=m+1
J 1X
m=0
exp[k + ik + m + im +  log(yi   pk   pm) +  (k;m; zi)];
and  is the set of parameters. Moreover, let qij denote the sum of probabilities of choosing
product j for household i. Then, qij will be given by
qij =
1
Fi
X
l2(Jnfjg)[f0g
exp[j + ij + l + il +  log(yi   pj   pl) +  (j; l;zi)]:
Notice that this qij might exceed one, because household 0 purchase more than one product
in my model.
3.3 Firm Behavior
Each rm f , f = 1; 2;    ; F , maximizes the following prot function;
max
fpjgj2Ff
X
j2Ff
(pj  mcj)Mspj (p;x;;  );
with
ln(mcj) = xj 0 + !j ;
where Ff is the set of products produced by rm f , mcj denotes the cost function of
product j, M denotes the potential market size, spj (p;x;) denotes the market share for
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product j,  denotes the cost parameters for the product characteristics, and !j represents
the unobservable cost factors. This formulation is able to capture not only the strategic
interaction among rms, but also the pricing strategy within a single rm. Due to the fact
that there are only seven manufacturers in the Japanese automobile market, it is natural to
assume that their price setting behaviors are aected by other rms' strategies. Moreover,
all rms produce multiple products in Japan. Thus, when setting prices, the rms need to
consider not only other rms' strategies, but also the eect of their own pricing strategies
on other products they produce.
Taking the rst order condition with respect to pj , I can obtain the following Bertrand-
Nash equilibrium condition;
Dj(p;  ) +
X
k2Ff
(pk  mck)@Dk(p)
@pj
= 0; (3.4)
whereDj(p;  ) =Ms
p
j (p;x; ).
4 The rst order conditions can be written in the following
matrix form;
D(p;  ) +(p mc) = 0;
where D, p, and c represent vectors of demand, price, and marginal cost, and  denotes
4I use this equation (3.4) for counterfactual analyses, when I nd Bertrand-Nash equilibrium under new
price vectors.
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a J  J matrix with (k;m) element dened by
km =
8>>>><>>>>:
@Dk
@pm
; if k and m are produced by the same rm;
0; otherwise.
Furthermore, the system of rst order conditions can be solved for the vector of the
marginal costs, mc, i.e.,
mc = p  1D(p;  ):
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Chapter 4
Estimation
4.1 Overview
If there is no unobservable term,  nor , in the utility function, then the estimation can
be done in a straight forward way, such as maximum likelihood, so that we can match
the market share for each product to that observed in the macro data, or the individual
choice probabilities to those observed in the micro data. In my model, however, there is
an unobservable term, , in the utility function. Thus, I apply the strategy developed by
Berry (1994) and commonly used in other papers such as Berry et al. (1995) and Petrin
(2002). Although Berry et al. (1995) uses only macro-level market share data, I have both
micro-level decision data and macro-level market share data. In this situation, as Petrin
(2002) developed and Berry et al. (2004) applied, I construct the GMM objective function
from both micro- and macro-level data as moment conditions.1 Intuitively, I minimize the
set of moment conditions from micro-level data subject to the moment conditions from
1The theoretical background is given by Imbens and Lancaster (1994).
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macro-level data being equal to zero. In particular, given a set of parameter values, I
match the macro market share for each product by changing the mean utilities, the , in
the rst stage. Then, after matching the market shares, I evaluate the other moments
using the set of parameter values and the mean utilities, the , which together satises the
moment conditions for the macro data.
4.2 Objective Function
I estimate the parameters,  = (; fm;om; umgMm=1; fr; rgRr=1;0; ), by matching four
\sets" of predicted moments to their data analogues: (i) the market share of each product;
(ii) the covariance between the observed consumer attributes zpi and the observed product
characteristics, xj which are chosen by the households that purchase only one automobile;
(iii) the covariance between the observed product characteristics of two automobiles for
those households purchasing two automobiles; and (iv) the rst order conditions from
the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium condition. In this section, I dene these sets of moments,
explaining the algorithm and procedure of my estimation.
4.2.1 Macro Market Share
The rst set of moments, the market shares of the J products, can be derived by the
following procedure. Let w denote the vector of observed and unobserved individual het-
erogeneity, i.e., w = (zi;i; "i; ). Moreover, let Pw denote the distribution of w in the
population. Then, given an initial guess of mean utilities, the 0, and a set of parameters,
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the , the model predicts the market share for product j as
spj (;) =
Z
Aj(;)
Pwd(w);
where
Aj(;) = fwjmax
k;m
[ui;(k;m)] = ui;(j;l) for j  lg:
This expression means that the demand for product j is generated by households who
purchase product j. In order to calculate this market share vector, I use the simulation
methods. Households are characterized by their attributes, (zi; yi). Thus, I draw 10,000
households from the joint distribution of zi using Census data, and I simulate income
for these households based on zi and KHPS.2 For these simulated households, I calculate
the choice probabilities for possible choices each product in order to integrate out the
heterogeneity at the individual household level. Then, I sum up these probabilities to
obtain the theoretical market share. In other words, I approximate the market shares by
spj (()) =
1
2N
NX
i=1
8<:
JX
l=j+1
J 1X
j=0
Pr(di1 = j; di2 = ljzi; yi;i;x;; )
9=;
where N represents the number of households in Japan. The choice probabilities are given
by equation (3.3) in the previous section. The reason why I divide the sum of probabilities
by 2 is potential market share for product j can be more than one. I dene the rst set
of moments by taking a dierence between empirical and predicted market shares for each
2This procedure relies on the representativeness of KHPS. I disccss in detail in Section 4.
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product j:
G1j () = sj   spj (())
where sj denote the empirical market share.
After obtaining the predicted market shares, I utilize the contraction mapping method
developed by Berry et al. (1995). Until the dierence between the predicted market shares
and the empirical market shares is small, I iterate this procedure by updating the mean
utilities, . By doing so, I can exactly match the product-level market shares, i.e., G1() =
0, and obtain the vector of mean utilities, the (), which satises the rst moment, given
the parameter values, the .
4.2.2 Covariance between Households Attributes and Product Charac-
teristics
The second set of moments is derived from the micro data. Having obtained , it is straight-
forward to calculate the choice probabilities for each household in the KHPS samples by
using the household characteristics via equation (3.3). Now, because I know zi exactly, so
I do not need to integrate them out, though I still need to integrate i out. After obtaining
these probabilities, I construct the covariance of the observed consumer attributes zpi with
the observed product characteristics xj which are chosen by the households. Conceptu-
ally, it should be E[zxD  zxP ] where xD and xP denote the product characteristics of the
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empirical data and model prediction, respectively. More precisely, I can obtain it as
G2() =
1
jB1j
X
i2B1
24zi
8<:
JX
j=1
(xj1fdi=jg   xjPr[di1 = 0; di2 = jjx; zi;])
9=;
35 ;
where B1 denotes the set of households who purchase one product in the KHPS. This set
of moment conditions is useful to identify o, since it enables us to predict the kinds of
household attributes that incline them to purchase a particular product.
4.2.3 Covariance between Observed Characteristics for Two Automo-
biles
Next, I set the third set of moments as the covariance of the observed product charac-
teristics for two automobiles, given that the households eventually own two automobiles.
Conceptually, it should be E[xD1 x
D
2  xP1 xP2 ] where xPl and xDl denote the l-th automobile's
characteristics of the model prediction and actual data, respectively. More precisely, I can
obtain it as
G3() =
1
jB2j =
X
i2B2
24 JX
l=j+1
J 1X
j=0
n
xjxl1fd1i=jg1fd2i=j0g
 xjxlPr(di1 = j; di2 = ljzi;i;x;; )
o#
;
where B2 denotes the set of households who purchase two products in the KHPS. These
moment conditions are particularly important for identifying the coecients in the portfolio
eect terms, such as r. This is because that these moment conditions enable us to predict
the kinds of household attributes that incline them to purchase a particular combination
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of products.
First order conditions for rms Finally, the fourth set of moments comes from the
rst order conditions for rms. The rst order conditions derived in Section 3 is
mc = p  1D;
and I can solve for the unobserved product specic costs, !j for each product j. As a matter
of convention, as sets of instrument for this set of moments, I use (i) the average product
characteristics produced by other rms, (ii) the average characteristics of products other
than j, produced by the same rm, and (iii) characteristics of product j. Thus, dening
Z4 as the sets of instrument explained above, the fourth set of moments can be expressed
as follows:
G4() = E[Z4!]:
4.2.4 The GMM Estimator
I use the Method of Simulated Moment (MSM) to estimate this model, i.e., I solve the
following minimization problem;
min
2
G()0S 1G()
subject to G1() = 0
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where S is a weighting matrix which is a consistent estimate of E[G()G()0] and
G() = [G2() G3() G4()]0:
This minimization problem illustrates that I minimize the sets of moment conditions from
micro data, G2(), G3(), and G4(), given the set of moment conditions from macro
data, G1() being equal to zero. I use Nelder and Mead (1965) simplex method to nd ^.
4.2.5 Variances of Parameter Estimates
The variance-covariance of the parameters can be decomposed into two parts: (1) the
derivative matrix of the rst order conditions evaluated at the true parameter values, and
(2) the variance-covariance of the rst order conditions evaluated at the true parameter
values, as shown in Hansen (1982).
As for (1), it can be consistently estimated by taking derivative of the sample moment's
rst order condition, which is given by
 ^ij =
@Gj()
@i

=^
;
where Gj is the j-th element dened in the previous section. Notice that this  ^ is dierent
from the portfolio eect term.3
As for (2), there are three sources of randomness: (i) the standard GMM variance term
given by V^ 1 = S(^), (ii) the dierence between observed market shares and true market
3In order to follow the standard notation in this literature, I use  ^ to denote the derivative matrix in
this section.
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shares which is zero in my case, i.e., V^ 2 = 0, and (iii) simulation error in my calculations.
The variance term due to simulation error can be given by
V^ 3 =
1
H
HX
h=1
"
G(^; P hns) 
1
H
HX
h=1
G(^; P hns)
#"
G(^; P hns) 
1
H
HX
h=1
G(^; P hns)
#0
;
where P hns is independently redrawn H times.
As a consequence, the asymptotic variance of
p
n(^   ) is given by
( ^
0
 ^) 1 ^
0
(V^ ) ^( ^
0
 ^) 1:
where V^ is the sum of three sources of randomness, because those are independent of each
other.
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Chapter 5
The Data
For this empirical study, I mainly use three datasets; Keio Household Panel Survey which
contains household-level data on purchasing decisions, New Motor Vehicle Registrations
which gives the aggregate sales number of automobiles in a given year, and Automotive
Guidebook which provides the product-level panel data. I describe the characteristics of
these datasets and show some summary statistics in this section.
5.1 Dataset
5.1.1 Keio Household Panel Survey
The Keio Household Panel Survey is provided by Keio University, a private research uni-
versity in Tokyo, Japan. One of the main goals of KHPS is to provide the Japanese
household-level micro panel data in order to promote empirical research about Japan. The
sample size of KHPS was approximately 4,000 households from 2004 to 2006.1 In terms of
1Starting from 2007, the sample size increased by 1,400 households with 2,500 individuals. Thus we
currently have 5,400 households with 9,500 individuals in total.
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automobile ownership, KHPS inquires in 2004 about: (1) month and year of purchase; (2)
maker, brand, and model of each automobile; and (3) whether it was purchased as a new
car or a used car, for up to three cars. Every year after 2004, KHPS inquires (1) whether
the household purchases automobiles or not up to two cars; and (2) whether the household
discards automobiles or not up to two cars. I extract information from these three years
of data.
5.1.2 New Motor Vehicle Registrations
The New Motor Vehicle Registrations series issued by Japan Automobile Dealers Associ-
ation provides the number of automobiles sold in a given year under the supervision of
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transportation, and Tourism. Because all Japanese au-
tomobiles must be registered with the government, the exact numbers of each automobile
sold in a given year is available.2
5.1.3 Automotive Guidebook: Micro Data for Products
The Automotive Guidebook series is issued by Japan Automobile Manufactures Association
(JAMA) every year. I construct the product-level panel data from this series of books,
since each edition provides the set of available automobile models and the characteristics
for each, such as price, interior and exterior dimensions, seating capacity, and engine
displacement. Table 5.1 shows the average characteristics of automobiles sold in 2004 to
2006.
2As for the sales of used automobiles, however, it is dicult to know the exact number of automobile
sales since there are so many companies which deal with used cars and it is dicult to collect and aggregate
this decentralized market information. I will discuss this issue later.
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5.2 Deciding on a Choice Set
Foreign Automobiles I decided not to use foreign automobiles. There are two reasons
for this. First of all, Foreign automobiles hold tiny market shares in Japan. Domestic
automobiles are dominant in Japan and about 94% of the market share is held by auto-
mobiles produced by domestic automobile manufacturers. Second, compared to Japan's
domestic automobiles, information about foreign automobiles is mis-reported often in my
micro data. Therefore, I chose to use only domestic automobiles in this empirical study.
Secondary Markets I do not use the secondary market data for this empirical exercise.
There are two reasons for this. Most importantly, the secondary market is not big in Japan,
and more than 65% of them purchase new automobiles in KHPS. This is partially because
of the costly automobile inspection system and owning old automobiles is costly in Japan.
Second, the total sales data for secondary market is not available in Japan. Compared to
the sales of brand new cars, the secondary market is not well monitored by the government.
Even though statistics on total automobile \trading" exist, it is hard to know how many
cars are sold/purchased, because in these statistics, we must count the number of trades
as two when someone sells an automobile to a used car dealer and the used car dealer then
sells it to another person. On the other hand, if someone sells an automobile directly to a
friend, we only need count it as one trade. In other words, one transfer of ownership counts
as one trade, which makes counting the actual sales dicult. In addition to this problem
in macro data issue, micro data, KHPS, does not include details about automobile models,
nor does it include used car sales prices. Therefore, I ignore used car purchases, because
it is not possible to use the information from the macro- and micro-data correctly.
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The Choice Set To nalize the choice set, I also eliminate several discontinued domestic
automobile models during 2004 to 2006 and whose sales are less than 1,000 per year.
This leaves 154 automobiles that I use in this study. Also, because very few households
purchased two minivans and none of them purchased two exactly identical automobiles, I
exclude the combinations of two minivans and two identical products from the potential
choice set.
5.3 Descriptive Statistics
In this section, using the datasets introduced above, I summarize some descriptive statistics
for automobiles included in the choice set. Table 5.1 displays means, standard deviations,
and the max and min of several automobile characteristics for each category. Compared to
other automobiles, it is clear that kei-cars have less seating capacity, horsepower, and pol-
luting gas emissions, but are more fuel-ecient and aordable. Also, within the categories
of kei-car and minivan, the standard deviations for each characteristic are much smaller
than for regular cars. This is because regular cars include all automobiles, except kei-cars
and minivans, i.e., the regular car category includes hatchbacks, sedans, station wagons,
sport cars, and sport utility vehicles (SUVs).
Table 5.2 lists all domestic automobile manufacturers included in my estimation. It also
shows the number of models and aggregate sales for each category by these manufacturers.
The table clearly indicates that the total sales for kei-cars and minivans are indeed huge
in Japan, accounting for about 31% and 21% of total automobile sales, respectively. In
particular, while kei-car models represent only about 20% of all considered automobile
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models, the total number of kei-car sales accounts for 30% of the total automobile sales,
implying that each kei-car model has more sales than other types of automobiles, on
average. It is also clear that several rms, such as Mitsubishi and Suzuki, rely heavily on
kei-car production, because kei-cars represent 63% and 88% of their unit sales, respectively.
Mazda and Nissan, on the other hand, sold signicantly fewer numbers of kei-cars. In
particular, Mazda's kei-cars represent only 16.5 % of its sales, even though Mazda produces
ve models of kei-car.
5.4 Data Implementation
5.4.1 Decision Period
I chose the three years from 2003 to 2005 as one decision period.3 That is, as long as a
household purchases automobiles within that period, I assume that the household purchases
automobiles in a decision period. Three years might not be long enough, because some
fraction of households that eventually purchase two automobiles might not purchase both
of them within the decision period. They might purchase just one automobile within these
three years, and purchase another automobile later. Thus, the longer the decision period,
the better the estimation.
However, interestingly, the automobile purchase cycle of Japanese households' is quick.
This is because the Japanese government has implemented a costly automobile inspection
system for car owners. If a consumer purchases an brand new automobile, that car must
get inspected after three years of purchase, and every other year after that. The cost of
3Hendel (1999) also uses three years as one decision period to studies the demand of personal computers
for rms.
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automobile inspection is about $1,000 to $2,500 USD per inspection. Many households
discard their automobiles at the end of three, or ve years in order to avoid the inspection
costs. Therefore, by observing their purchasing behavior for three years, I can predict their
eventual number of automobile purchases with high accuracy.
5.4.2 Alternative Data Implementation
It is also possible to model consumers' utility based on the current automobile holding,
taking advantage of panel structure of the data. For example, suppose a household pur-
chased one minivan before 2002, and one kei-car during the decision period, as described
in Figure 7.3. An alternative way of using data would be to estimate demand parameters
Figure 5.1: Alternative Modeling of Consumers Decision
depending on the category of current automobile, or specifying dierent utility functions
depending on the current automobile holding. In that way, I might be able to take ad-
vantage of information from the data. However, these alternative ways of modeling have
endogeneity problems. If a household expects that the government would eliminate tax
subsidies for small automobiles in the near future, they might not purchase a combination
of one minivan and one kei-car that they would purchase. In order to avoid this issue, my
model does not allow utility to vary by the current automobile holdings.
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5.4.3 Potential Market Share
As Nevo (2000) notes, the potential market size is one of the big issues in this Berry et
al. (1995) style random coecient model, because the potential market size is crucial for
the market share of outside options. As Berry et al. (1995) dealt with this problem and
Nevo (2000) suggested, the most common way of setting the potential market size is to use
the number of households in the market. However, in this study, I allow the households
to choose more than one alternative. Thus, I set the potential market share as the sum of
the doubled number of households, i.e., 83,669,000.
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Table 5.1: Mean and Std. Dev. of Product Characteristics for Each Category
Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max
Capacity (person)
Kei-car 31 3.87 0.50 2 4
Regular 94 5.09 1.04 2 8
Minivan 29 7.27 0.65 6 8
All 154 5.25 1.40 2 8
Fuel Eciency (km/l)
Kei-car 31 16.4 2.22 10 22
Regular 94 12.9 3.88 6 30
Minivan 29 12.2 2.82 7 19
All 154 13.5 3.72 6 30
Horsepower (PS/rpm)
Kei-car 31 57.6 4.99 43 67
Regular 94 154.6 57.9 76 280
Minivan 29 151.6 33.5 86 240
All 154 134.5 61.2 43 280
Displacement (cc)
Kei-car 31 658 0.85 656 659
Regular 94 2068 720.2 1096 4494
Minivan 29 2130 495.2 1297 3498
All 154 1797 829.0 656 4494
Price ($)
Kei-car 31 14,487 2,125 10,643 18,725
Regular 94 28,265 10,778 12,250 57,125
Minivan 29 29,760 7,813 17,130 46,943
All 154 25,741 10,733 10,643 57,125
Note: For each product characteristic and each automobile category, I report the mean, standard
deviation, minimum, and maximum. For price calculation, I use the following exchange rate: $1.00 =
U 80.0.
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Table 5.2: List of Automobile Makers and Product Lineups
Number of models Units sold (Q)
Manufacturers Kei-car Regular Minivan Kei-car Regular Minivan
Daihatsu/Toyota 8 44 11 1,173,235 2,924,224 1,372,277
(12.7%) (69.8%) (17.5%) (21.4%) (53.5%) (25.1%)
Honda 3 8 6 652,333 763,918 688,781
(17.6%) (47.1%) (35.3%) (31.0%) (36.3%) (32.7%)
Mazda 5 8 3 112,458 410,603 157,422
(31.3%) (50.0%) (18.8%) (16.5%) (60.3%) (23.1%)
Mitsubishi 4 5 3 430,059 198,724 56,752
(33.3%) (41.7%) (25.0%) (62.7%) (29.0%) (8.3%)
Nissan 1 21 5 133,389 1,485,896 380,199
(3.7%) (77.8%) (18.5%) (6.7%) (74.3%) (19.0%)
Subaru 3 3 0 194,459 267,932 0
(50.0%) (50.0%) (0.0%) (42.1%) (57.9%) (0.0%)
Suzuki 7 5 1 1,246,095 165,258 4,784
(53.8%) (38.5%) (7.7%) (88.0%) (11.7%) (0.3%)
Total 31 94 29 3,942,028 6,216,555 1,372,277
(20.1%) (61.0%) (18.8%) (30.8%) (48.5%) (20.8%)
Note: The rst three columns show the number of products which fall into each category for each rm.
The next three columns show the total sales of products in each category. The numbers in parentheses
display the percentage of models and units sold for each category within a rm.
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Chapter 6
Estimation Results
6.1 Estimates
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present the demand side estimates. Table 6.1 displays the parameters
associated with random coecients, while Table 6.2 lists the parameters in the portfolio
eect term. As one can see from these tables, most of the estimates are statistically
signicant.
For the parameter estimates associated with random coecients, I rst show the coe-
cients for the log of the income term, log(yi  pj), which are interacted with the percentile
income. These are listed in the top three rows. As household level income increases, 
becomes larger. Similar results can be observed in Petrin (2002). I have a larger coecient
 for 50% to 75% percentile income households than for slightly wealthy households. This
might be a result of dropping expensive domestic automobiles and foreign automobiles from
the choice set. The average prices for foreign automobiles are much higher than those of
domestic automobiles. Thus, by dropping them from the choice set, I might underestimate
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their marginal utility of automobile consumption.
The next three rows show the estimates associated with seating capacity. I include
the family size as one of the variables for explaining the valuation of seating capacity,
because a reduced form analysis indicates that family size is one of the most important
determinants for seating capacity. Not surprisingly, the result shows that a household
with more members is more likely to purchase an automobile with larger seating capacity,
showing high statistical signicance. The reason I have a relatively large standard deviation
for seating capacity may be because by the fact that some large-family households purchase
small capacity automobiles such as kei-cars, and vice versa, because they have already
owned one minivan and they do not purchase any cars during this period.
The rest of the parameters also can be interpreted in the same way. I include the age
of the household's head as one of the variables for explaining the valuation of horsepower.
Again, not surprisingly, the result shows that a higher head-of-household age contributes
to the purchase of automobiles with higher horsepower.
The estimation results for portfolio eects are presented in Table 6.2. The rst three
rows show the xed eect of having two automobiles. As one might expect, the larger
the number of earners within a household, the higher the probability of purchasing two
automobiles. In Japan, cities are classied by population, and the government categorizes
them into the following three groups: the 14 biggest cities, other cities, and villages.1 The
estimation results show that households in less populated areas are more likely to purchase
two automobiles. This is largely because public transportations in rural area are not well
And thus, households living in rural area tend to demand two automobiles.
1Recently, the categorization was changed because of municipal amalgamations that occurred between
2000 and 2005.
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The combination specic unobserved terms, listed in the next ve rows, shows that
combinations of kei-cars and minivans create the highest portfolio eect, whereas combi-
nations of two kei-cars give the lowest portfolio eect. The combination of two regular
cars also shows a positive portfolio eect, because the category of regular cars includes all
automobiles except kei-cars and minivans and households might enjoy the combination of
one sedan and one SUV, for example. According to the results, the presence of children
might also be a driving force in the purchase of at least one kei-car, because any combi-
nations that include at least one kei-car are higher than other combinations that do not
include any kei-cars.
Finally, the estimation results on the supply side are summarized in Table 6.3. The
negative coecient for MPG may be a result of the constant returns to scale assumption.
The reason is as follows: The best selling automobiles tend to have high MPG, and the
model predicts that these best selling automobiles should have a smaller marginal cost
than they actually do by assuming the constant returns to scale. Thus, by omitting sales
or production from the model, we might underestimate the coecient for MPG, because
sales and MPG are positively correlated and marginal cost is probably decreasing in sales.
In fact, Berry et al. (1995) encounter the same problem, and explain and solve this problem
by including sales data as an explanatory variable.2
6.2 Model Fit
The predicted macro market shares are exactly the same as the empirical market shares,
due to the rst step in the estimation procedure. Thus, I show the model t using my
2For more detail, see Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), pp.876-877.
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micro samples. Table 6.4 demonstrates the t of my model using the data for households
purchasing one automobile in the KHPS. I calculate the probability of choosing SUVs, sport
cars, and minivans, which are not directly targeted in the estimation procedure, using
the household attributes found in the micro data. My model also predicts the average
expenditure for automobiles. These numbers are reported in the second column, while
empirical probabilities and expenditures are reported in the third column. For example,
my model suggests that the choice probability for SUVs is 0.0390, whereas the empirical
data shows 0.0335. Predicted average expenditure's can be computed by summing up
prices weighted by the choice probabilities. My model indicates an average expenditure
of $21,369, which is almost identical to the average expenditure in the data ($21,286).
Overall, the results show that the model ts well.
Furthermore, I also report similar results for limiting the samples to those having
family size equal to four. This helps to clarify the extent of my model t. The predicted
choice probabilities and average expenditures are reported in the fourth column, and their
empirical counterparts are reported in the fth column. Excepting the choice probabilities
for sport cars, the results show that the model ts well. The reason I underestimate the
choice probabilities for sports cars is that my model does not include any variables that
distinguish sports cars from other automobiles. Although it might be possible to enhance
the t of my model by including a sport car dummy in my model, I hesitate to take the
approach that far because the choice probabilities for sports cars are so small.
Table 6.5 demonstrates the model t using only the households purchasing two auto-
mobiles in the KHPS. I report the predicted average characteristics for all automobiles
purchased by these households in the second column, and empirical averages in the third
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column. Notice that the average, standard error, minimum and maximum of horsepower
are 134.5, 61.2, 43, 280, respectively. (from Table 5.1). Thus, comparing the predicted
average horsepower, 97.21, with the empirical average horsepower, 97.68, I conclude the
model also ts well for those households that purchase two automobiles.
I also summarize the model t for some targeted moments in Table ??, using the
data from households purchasing two automobiles. In the table, I report the predicted
and empirical choice probabilities for each combination. I slightly overestimate the choice
probabilities for the combination of a kei-car and a minivan, while I slightly underestimate
the choice probabilities for the combination of a regular-size car and a minivan. Overall,
however, these probabilities are close to each other, which enables me to use this estimated
model for counterfactual analyses in the next section.
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Table 6.1: Estimated Parameters of the Demand Sides
Parameter Standard
Product Characteristics Estimate Error
Term on Price ()
Income  50 percentile (1) 14.98 0.450
Income 2 [50,75] (2) 44.78 2.368
Income  75 percentile (3) 42.11 2.063
Seating Capacity (1)
Mean (1) 0.242
 0.003
Family Size (o1;1) 0.010
 0.003
Std. Deviation (u1 ) 1.397
 0.034
Miles Per Gallon (2)
Mean (2) 0.159
 0.036
Std. Deviation (u2 ) 0.688
 0.026
log(HP) (3)
Mean (3) 0.240
 0.151
Age of Household Head (o3;1) 1.69E-04
 1.52E-06
Std. Deviation (u3 ) 0.030
 0.002
log(Weight) (4)
Mean (4) 0.418
 0.030
Std. Deviation (u4 ) 2.395
 0.307
Note: For horsepower and weight of automobiles, I use logarithms. ** and * indicate 95% and 90%
level of signicance, respectively.
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Table 6.2: Estimated Parameters for Portfolio Term
Parameter Standard
Estimate Error
Fixed eect of having two cars ( 0)
Number of earns 3.157 0.318
City dummy 3.674 0.758
Village dummy 3.548 0.113
Combination specic unobserved terms (r)
Kei-Kei -2.667 0.591
Kei-Regular 6.816 1.324
Kei-Minivan 9.446 1.310
Regular-Regular 7.361 1.032
Regular-Minivan 6.430 0.270
Presence of children interacted with combinations (r)
Kei-Kei 9.260 0.517
Kei-Regular 5.234 0.335
Kei-Minivan 4.117 0.288
Regular-Regular 3.496 0.300
Regular-Minivan 3.544 0.244
Note: The rst three columns display the variables included in the xed eect of having two auto-
mobiles,  0. The next ve columns display the estimation results for combination specic unobserved
terms. The last ve columns display the interaction terms between combinations of automobiles and
the presence of children. ** and * indicate 95% and 90% level of signicance, respectively.
Table 6.3: Estimated Parameters for Supply Side
Estimates S.E.
MPG -0.3100 0.0010
log(HP) 0.4202 0.0924
log(Weight) 0.2582 0.0278
Note: ** and * indicate 95% and 90% level of signicance, respectively.
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Table 6.4: Model Fit 1 - Households Purchasing One Automobile
All Samples Family Size = 4
Predicted Data Predicted Data
Probability of choosing SUV 0.0390 0.0335 0.0375 0.0376
Probability of choosing Sport 0.0038 0.0094 0.0055 0.0150
Probability of choosing Minivan 0.2600 0.2890 0.1845 0.1654
Average Expenditure ($) 21,369 21,286 19,622 19,846
Note: `All samples' means that I include all households that purchase one automobile during the
decision period. Probabilities of choosing particular categories of automobiles are aggregated with
the probabilities of choosing each automobile that falls into the category. Average expenditures are
calculated by summing up prices weighted by choice probabilities.
Table 6.5: Model Fit 2 - Households purchasing two automobiles
Predicted Data
Average Capacity 5.313 5.313
Average MPG 14.67 14.52
Average Horsepower 97.21 97.86
Note: Average characteristics computed by summing up characteristics for all automobiles weighted
by choice probabilities.
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Chapter 7
Counterfactual Analyses
Using the estimated model, I conduct two counterfactual analyses. The rst experiment
compares the eects of repealing current tax subsidies for small automobiles to the results
from a standard single choice model, micro-BLP. In the second experiment, to illustrate
the eectiveness of a bundling strategy in the presence of the portfolio eect, I explicitly
allow rms to use a bundling strategy. I describe these analyses in this chapter.
7.1 Repeal of Tax Subsidies
In this subsection, I examine the eects of repealing the tax subsidies for kei-cars. The
estimation results show that a positive portfolio eect exists between kei-cars and regular
cars or minivans. Thus, by ignoring a strong portfolio eect, we might overestimate the
eect of repealing tax subsidies for small automobiles. First, I describe the details of the
tax subsidies in Japan. Then I show the results of the simulation using an estimated
model. At the same time, I also show the results from a standard single-choice model as a
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benchmark.
7.1.1 Details of Tax Subsidies
When consumers purchase automobiles in Japan, there are three types of taxes. Table 7.1
summarizes these taxes. First of all, based on acquisition prices, consumers must pay an
automobile acquisition tax of 3% of the purchase price for any kei-cars and 5% for any other
automobiles. Second, consumers also must pay an automobile weight tax, which is $55 for
any kei-cars per year, and $79 for every 0.5 tons for other automobiles. Although it seems
the dierence between kei-cars and other cars is small, the Japanese government requires
consumers to pay the automobile weight tax for three years. Thus, multiplying by three,
the dierence will be more than $300. Finally, depending on the engine displacement of
the purchased automobile, consumers must pay an automobile tax or kei-car tax. This tax
is $90 for any kei-cars, while the automobile tax is at least $369 for other automobiles and
about $62 for every additional 500cc of engine displacement.1
To see how large these tax subsidies are, Table 7.3 summarizes tax payment for a
selected kei-car, the Nissan MOCO, as an example. The price, displacement and weight
of MOCO are $13,054, 658cc, and 850kg, respectively, Based on this information, we can
calculate the total tax with and without these tax subsidies. I nd that the dierence
would be more than $1,400, which is more than 10 percent of the original price. This
dierence might be large enough to change consumers' purchasing behavior.
These tax subsidies were introduced in the 1960s to make small automobiles more af-
fordable for Japanese households that could not aord to purchase regular size automobiles.
1Detail tax scheme is summarized in Table 7.2.
48
Later, the goal of this policy shifted to promote consumption of eco-friendly automobiles.
Recently, there has been discussion over whether these tax subsidies should be repealed
or not, and those who oppose the repeal claims that the demand for ekei-cars (which are
eco-friendly automobiles) would dramatically decrease. However, considering the strong
positive portfolio eects, it might not be the case. To examine the eects of repealing these
tax subsidies, I set the same tax scheme for small cars as regular automobiles.
7.1.2 Simulation Results
Table 7.4 summarizes by automobile category the predicted eects of repealing tax subsi-
dies. If subsidies were eliminated, the total demand for kei-cars would decrease by 12.2%,
and total demand for regular cars and minivans would increase 5.7% and 0.6%, respec-
tively. In order to compare these results to the case where there is no portfolio eect, I also
estimate micro-BLP model using the same dataset. The estimation results from micro-
BLP model are summarized in the middle column of Table 7.4, and the simulation results
suggest that the total demand for kei-cars (ignoring portfolio eects) would decrease by
16.7%. Thus, this dierence of about 5% can be accounted by the portfolio eect.
In Table 7.5, I show more detailed results for some selected kei-cars. Comparing the
fourth and fth columns (which display the percentage change in demand predicted by
micro-BLP and my model) one can see that the standard single choice model overesti-
mates the eects of repealing tax subsidies. Most automobiles are overestimated by 5%.
Table 7.5 indicates that demand for more expensive cars would tend to decrease, because
consumers would give up purchasing expensive kei-cars and would purchase relatively af-
fordable regular cars instead. However, those households that purchase cheap automobiles
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would not change their choices, because there is no cheaper class of automobiles available.
The COPEN, produced by Daihatsu, shows a strange pattern. Even though it is expensive,
the demand would not decrease much, because the COPEN is a sport type kei-car, and
there is no suitable substitute for this automobile, while other automobiles have a large
number of competitors.
There is one more interesting pattern in Table 7.5: the percentage changes in prices for
MR WAGON, KEI, and ALTO are almost zero, though other automobiles' prices increase
in my model's prediction. This is because these three automobiles are produced by Suzuki,
which mainly produces kei-cars. As Table 5.2 suggests, other manufacturers have many
substitutes for kei-cars, and thus they charge higher prices for kei-cars to shift the demand
toward their other automobiles. Suzuki, however, cannot do so.
I also display more detailed results for some selected minivans in Table 7.6. The
Micro-BLP model predicts that demand for minivans would slightly increase, while my
model predicts that demand for expensive minivans would decrease while demand for
aordable minivans would increase. This is because in micro-BLP model, all automobiles
are substitutes and thus choice probabilities for other automobiles increase when kei-cars'
prices are increased by repealing tax subsidies. Thus, the changes in demand for minivan
decreases, as the automobile prices increase. On the other hand, my model predicts that
the demand for expensive minivans would decrease. This can be explained by the fact that
there are some households highly value a combination of one one kei-car and one minivan.
Those households would purchase one kei-car and one slightly cheap minivan to maintain
their portfolios under the new tax policy. Thus, the demand for expensive minivans would
decrease. At the same time, the demand for aordable minivans would increase.
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Economic intuition behind these results are also conrmed by Figures 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3.
In Figure 7.1, I show the simulated changes in units sold from my model and micro-BLP
model, depending on engine displacement. It is clear that the demand for kei-cars decrease
sharply in both my model and micro-BLP model, while the demand for other automobiles
increase in both models. In particular, as automobiles' engine displacement increases, the
change is getting smaller. Moreover, I decompose these results depending on the category
of automobiles: regular cars and minivans. In Figure 7.2, the patterns are preserved.
However, in Figure 7.3, the The reason why I have smaller increase in the class of less than
1500cc minivans is there are only few number of minivans.
In Table 7.7, I show the simulated prots for automobile manufacturers in Japan.
Repealing the tax subsidies would cause lower prots for four out of seven manufacturers,
because those four rms rely heavily on prots from kei-cars. The other rms, however,
would achieve higher prots. One of the rms, Nissan, would increase its prot by 3.3%.
This is largely because Nissan produces only one model of kei-car among its 27 models.
Mazda would also get higher prots, even though it produces ve models of kei-car. This
is because Mazda's kei-cars are not its best-selling automobiles, and its total sales of kei-
cars account for only 16.5% of its prot, as seen in Table 5.2. In Figure 7.4, I show the
simulated changes in units sold for each manufacturers from my model and micro-BLP.
Finally, Table 7.8 presents the changes in consumer surplus, producer surplus, and tax
revenue. The results show that repealing tax subsidies would force consumers to spend
their money for purchasing automobiles, and thus their surplus would decrease remarkably.
Although the prots of Suzuki, one of the most famous manufacturers producing kei-cars,
would decrease by 9%, total producer surplus would remain nearly the same, as mentioned
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above. Lastly, tax revenue for the Japanese government would increase, because repealing
tax subsidies implies that the government keeps more money. Moreover, raising tax ratio
causes social welfare to decrease, and creates a dead-weight loss.
7.2 Mixed Bundling
The discovery of the strong portfolio eects between kei-cars and other categories of auto-
mobiles immediately raises the following questions: How would prots change if rms used
a bundling strategy? And, how would social welfare change as a consequence of these rms'
behavior? To answer the questions, I allow rms to use a particular bundling strategy in
this counterfactual analysis.
7.2.1 Competitive Mixed Bundling
In the following counterfactual analysis, I allow the use of mixed bundling strategy, where
rms are able to price the bundle of the products, as well as each product. To empirically
examine this mixed bundling strategy, I rst choose two rms and two products for each
rm. Then, I simulate the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium of this game.
The framework I use in this hypothetical bundling experiment is quite close to the
model used in Thanassoulis (2007).2 In Thanassoulis (2007), there are two rms and each
rm sells two products. These rms are competing in prices. There are consumers who
want to have only product A or B, and there are consumers who want to have both A and
B. Therefore, his model is similar to this hypothetical bundling setting. However, there are
2For more comprehensive discussion on price discrimination including bundling, see the recent survey
by Armstrong (2007).
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two dierences. First of all, consumers in my model are not limited to purchasing one or
two products, whereas consumers in his model are explicitly assumed to purchase a specic
number of products, exogenously. Second, when consumers purchase two products in my
model, they might purchase two same types of products, say two A's, whereas consumers
must purchase a combination of A and B in his model.
Most empirical literature on product bundling that use structural approach focus on
channel bundling in Cable TV industries, where bundles include more than ten products.3
The mixed bundling strategy this paper applies is also closely related to second degree price
discrimination, because rms can price discriminate consumers by charging dierent prices
when they purchase more than one product, i.e., quantity discount. This is because that
this strategy can be viewed as a coupon which can be obtained at the rst purchase and
redeemed at the second purchase. There are several papers that empirically study second
degree price discrimination. For example, Cohen (2008) develop an equilibrium model to
examine whether second degree price discrimination occurs in paper towel industry, and
welfare eect under counterfactual pricing scheme.4
7.2.2 Simulation Results
As described above, I choose two rms, namely Honda and Toyota, and two products for
each rm. For Honda, I choose one kei-car, LIFE (Product H1), and one regular car, FIT
(Product H2). For Toyota, I choose one kei-car, MOVE (Product T1), and one regular car,
VITZ (Product T2). Thus, there are only four available automobiles in this hypothetical
3For example, see Crawford (2000), Crawford and Shum (2006), Crawford and Yurukoglu (2009) and
Goolsbee and Petrin (2004).
4Other examples include, Verboven (2002) and McManus (2007).
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setting, though the demand structure is the same as before. Then, I nd the Bertrand-
Nash equilibrium for each case where rms are banned from bundling as a benchmark to
compare the case where rms can use the mixed bundling strategy.
More precisely, in the case where rms are banned from bundling, each rm f , f = H;T ,
solves the following maximization problem:
max
pf1 ;p
f
2
2X
i=1
h
pfiD
f
i (p)  Cfi (Dfi (p))
i
;
while, in the case where rms can use the mixed bundling strategy, each rm f , f = H;T ,
solves the following maximization problem:
max
pf1 ;p
f
2 ;p
f
B
2X
i=1
h
pfiD
f
i (p)  Cfi (Dfi (p))
i
  pfB
Z
E
Pwd(w);
where
E = fwju(f1; f2)  u(j; l) for8(j; l)g:
The set E denotes a set of consumers who purchase both types of product from the same
rm f , and they are eligible to get discount of pfB. And thus, rms' prot should be
subtracted by pfB
R
EPwd(w), as rms need to give discount for those who purchase two
products. Therefore, this mixed bundling strategy can be seen as one of the form of
bundle-size pricing or volume discounting.5
Table 7.9 summarizes all of the simulation results. The second column shows the prices
5Chu, Leslie and Sorensen (2011) empirically shows that the mixed bundling strategy can be approxi-
mated by the bundle-size pricing strategy.
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for automobiles and prots for rms when these rms are banned from bundling, while
the third column shows the prices for automobiles and prots for rms when they use
bundling strategies. First of all, the results shows that both rms have an incentive to use
a mixed bundling strategy, yielding higher prots for both rms. By observing that prices
for bundles are strictly less than the sum of two products for each rm, one can conrm
the validity of this result.
To interpret the results, suppose rms are banned from using bundling. In that case,
their prices should be the same as in the second column. When rms can use bundling,
both rms set the price of the product bundle to the sum of the prices of the kei-car and
the regular car in the bundle. Then, these rms would obtain the same prot. Now, most
consumers who want one automobile would purchase one automobile, even if rms charge
higher prices for separate automobiles, because they are less price elastic than consumers
who want to have two automobiles. Moreover, as long as both rms are charging the same
prices for their bundles, neither rm would lose prots. Thus, the rms can charge higher
prices for separate, non-bundled automobiles. However, these rms are also competing in
prices at the same time, and cannot increase their prices much.
According to Thanassoulis (2007), the prices for bundles should be less than the sum
of the component prices of no bundling case. That is, pHB and pTB should be less than
15; 962 + 18; 667 and 14; 372 + 15; 713, respectively. However, as mentioned before, this
model setting is slightly dierent from his model. In particular, all four automobiles in
this experiment are dierentiated, implying that the bundles oered by the two rms are
also dierentiated. This mechanism drives up these bundling prices.
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Table 7.1: List of Taxes Associated with Automobile Purchases
Kei-cars Full-size cars
Automobile 3% of acquisition 5% of acquisition
Acquisition Tax price price
Automobile U 4,400 ($55.00) U 6,300/500kg
Weight Tax for any kei-cars ($78.75/0.5t)
Automobile Tax/ U 7,200 ($90.00) See
Kei-car Tax for any kei-cars Table 7.2
Note: Listed prices for automobile weight tax and automobile/kei-car tax are annual rates, and con-
sumers are required to pay these taxes for three years. I use the following exchange rate: $ 1.00 = U
80.
Table 7.2: Annual Automobile Tax
Displacement (cc) Fee ($)
less than 1000 369
1001-1500 431
1501-2000 494
2001-2500 563
2501-3000 638
3001-3500 725
3501-4000 831
4001-4500 956
4501-6000 1,100
more than 6000 1,375
Note: I use the following exchange rate: $1.00 = U 80.
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Table 7.3: Example of Tax Subsidies for a Selected Kei-car, MOCO
With Tax Subsidies Without Tax Subsidies
Original Price $13,054 $13,054
Tax
Acquisition Tax $392 $653
Automobile Weight Tax $165 $473
Automobile/Kei-car Tax $270 $1,106
Tax sub-total $827 $2,232
Note: MOCO is produced by Nissan. MOCO's engine displacement is 658cc and its weight is 850kg.
Because automobile weight tax must be paid for three years, I multiply the numbers by three. Although
the automobile/kei-car must be paid annually, most Japanese households do not discard an automobile
within three years, thus I also multiplied them by three. For prices, I use the following exchange rate:
$1.00 = U 80.
Table 7.4: Tax Elimination Eect on Automobile Sales
micro BLP my Model
Current (w/o P.E.) (w P.E.)
Sales After % After %
Kei-cars 3,942,028 3,282,371 -16.73 3,461,484 -12.19
Regular 6,216,555 6,802,675 9.43 6,571,925 5.72
Minivan 2,660,215 2,686,029 0.97 2,675,633 0.58
Total 12,818,798 12,771,075 -0.37 12,709,042 -0.86
Note: The third and fth columns show the total units sold for each category after repealing tax
subsidies, predicted by micro-BLP and my model, respectively. The fourth and sixth columns show
the % changes from the current sales to the predicted sales.
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Figure 7.1: Change in Units Sold for All Automobiles
−
60
00
00
−
40
00
00
−
20
00
00
0
20
00
00
40
00
00
Kei−car −1500cc −2000cc −2500cc −3000cc −3500cc 3501cc−
Prediction from My Model Prediction from Micro BLP
60
Figure 7.2: Change in Units Sold for Regular Cars
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Figure 7.3: Change in Units Sold for Minivans
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Figure 7.4: Change in Units Sold for Manufacturers
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Table 7.7: Tax Elimination Eect on Producer Surplus
Prot Product Lineup
Before After % Kei Reg. Mini.
Daihatsu/Toyota 61,701 62,340 +1.04 8 44 11
Honda 15,166 15,063  0.67 3 8 6
Mazda 4,524 4,661 +3.02 5 8 3
Mitsubishi 4,565 4,338  4.96 4 5 3
Nissan 15,508 16,021 +3.30 1 21 5
Subaru 3,158 3,120  1.21 3 3 0
Suzuki 10,787 9,876  8.45 7 5 1
Total 115,409 115,418 +0.01 31 94 29
Note: The second and third columns show the estimated prots under the current tax policy, and the
simulated prots under the new tax policy where there are no tax subsidies for kei-cars. The fourth
column displays the percentage change for rms' prot. The remaining columns show the number of
models that each manufacturer produces. Prot gures are measured in millions of dollars, and I use
the following exchange rate: $1.00 = U 80.
Table 7.8: Welfare Implication in Million Dollars
(Consumer Surplus)  7,106
(Producer Surplus) +9
(Tax Revenues) +5,934
Note: For consumer surplus, I use compensation varia-
tions (CV). Figures are expressed in millions of dollars,
and I use the following exchange rate: $1.00 = U 80.
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Table 7.9: Mixed Bundling Strategy
No Bundling Bundling
Honda
Price for Kei (pH1 ) 15,962 19,085
Price for Regular (pH2 ) 18,667 20,485
Price for Bundle (pHB )   35,565
Prot for Honda 57,509 62,797
Toyota
Price for Kei (pT1 ) 14,372 14,602
Price for Regular (pT2 ) 15,713 19,154
Price for Bundle (pTB)   31,455
Prot for Toyota 48,973 50,348
Note: Prot gures are measured in millions of dollars. The second and third columns display the simulation
results where two rms are banned from bundling and where two rms can use bundling, respectively. I use
the following exchange rate: $1.00 = U 80.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
In this paper, I develop a market equilibrium model where consumers can purchase up to
two automobiles taking into account portfolio eects which depend on household attributes
and product characteristics, and rms strategically set the prices for their products. I
then estimate the model using unique Japanese household level panel data on automobile
purchases, as well as macro data on market shares, in order to examine the role these
portfolio eects play. My estimates suggest that strong positive portfolio eects exist
between kei-cars and regular cars, or kei-cars and minivans. Moreover, those portfolio
eects are stronger, if a household lives in an rural area or if a household has multiple
earners.
Ignoring such portfolio eects leads to biased counterfactual analyses. For example, I
conduct a counterfactual experiment where the Japanese government repeals current tax
subsidies for kei-cars. My model suggests that a repeal of the current tax subsidies for
small automobiles would decrease the demand for small automobiles by 12%, which is
smaller than the 17% drop predicted by a standard discrete choice model, i.e., micro-BLP
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model. The simulation results from my model also show that the demand for expensive
minivans would decrease and the demand for aordable minivans would increase, whereas
the demand for all automobiles except kei-cars would increase in micro-BIL model.
I also conduct another counterfactual experiment where rms are explicitly allowed to
use a bundling strategy. More specically, I chose two rms and two products for each
rm, and I simulate the Nash equilibrium where (i) rms are banned from using a mixed
bundling strategy, and (ii) rms are explicitly allowed to use a mixed bundling strategy. My
simulation results show that rms do have an incentive to use a mixed bundling strategy.
Compared to the case where rms are banned from using a mixed bundling strategy, both
the single-car prices and the bundle prices are higher.
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Appendix A
Description of Variables
A.1 Household Attributes
Table A.1 summarizes the variables for household attributes. Except the variable `Income',
I use household attributes reported in 2004. As for income, I calculate it by
zi;income =
2005X
t=2003
NHiX
h=1
zi;t;h;income;
where NHi is the number of earners in household i. Thus, this denition is the total
income of household i over the decision period.
A.2 Product Characteristics
In this dissertation, I use three years as one decision period, and within that period, product
characteristics might change by year. Therefore, I dene product j's characteristics by
taking averages for three years. More precisely,
xj;l =
1
nl
2005X
t=2003
xj;l;t;
where
nl =
2005X
t=2003
1fif product l exists in tg:
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Table A.1: Description of Variables for Household Attributes
Variables Description
Income Total income of the household
Family Size The number of individuals who live together in a household
Age of HH Head The age of the household head
Number of Earners The number of people who have any income within the household
Presence of Children The dummy variable for whether the household has any children
Living Area The dummy variable for whether the household lives in the
the following categories:
14 Biggest Cities Metropolitan areas in Japan
Cities Cities whose population is more than 50,000
Villages Remaining areas
Note: 14 biggest cities include Tokyo, Sapporo, Sendai, Saitama, Chiba, Yokohama, Kawasaki, Nagoya,
Kyoto, Osaka, Kobe, Hiroshima, Kita-Kyushu, and Fukuoka.
Table A.2: Description of Variables for Automobile Characteristics
Variables Description
Capacity Seating capacity measured by the number of people
Miles Per Gallon Fuel eciency measured in km/l
Horsepower Horsepower measured in PS/rpm
Weight Weight measured in kg
Size Exterior Width  Length measured in cm2
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Appendix B
Technical Appendix
B.1 Substitution Matrix
In Section 3, I dene the sum of the probability that a household i choose product j in its
portfolio as
qij =
1
Fi
X
l2(Jnfjg)[f0g
exp[j + ij + l + il +  log(yi   pj   pl) +  (j; l;zi)]:
where
Fi = exp[ log(yi)] +
JX
k=m+1
J 1X
m=0
exp[k + ik + m + im +  log(yi   pk   pm) +  (k;m; zi)];
Then, each own price elasticity for product j is given by
@qij
@pj
=  1  qij
Fi
X
l2J[f0g
 exp[j + ij + l + il +  log(yi   pj   pl) +  (j; l; zi)]
yi   pj   pl ;
whereas cross price elasticities for product j with respect to product n, n 6= j, is given by
@qij
@pn
=
qij
Fi
X
l2J[f0g
 exp[n + in + l + il +  log(yi   pn   pl) +  (n; l; zi)]
yi   pn   pl
1
Fi
 exp[j + ij + n + in +  log(yi   pj   pn) +  (n; j;zi)]
yi   pj   pn :
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Therefore, summing over i, I can obtain the market level price elasticities:
@sk
@pm
=
NX
i=1
@qik
@pn
:
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Appendix C
Computational Appendix
In this technical appendix section, I explain the simulation and estimation procedure.
1. Prepare random draws, which do not change throughout estimation, for the macro
moment, G1, and the micro moments, G2 and G3.
(a) Draw i = 1;    ; nM consumers from the joint distribution of characteristics
given by the Census data, FM1(z). And, we also need to draw correspond-
ing unobserved consumer characteristics from multivariate normal distribution,
FM2().
(b) For each consumer i = 1;    ; nm in KHPS, draw ns times from multivariate
normal distribution, Fm() of unobserved consumer characteristics vector.
2. Choose an initial guess of parameters, 0.
3. Calculate the predicted market share for each product, sPj , by summing up choice
probabilities for each consumer i = 1;    ; nM . Using the contraction mapping de-
veloped by Berry et al. (1995),
t+1j = 
t
j + ln(sj)  ln(sPj ());
iterate until the dierence between the predicted market share and the empirical
market shares is small. This step enable to nd a vector of the mean utilities, j (0),
which satises the rst moment being equal to zero, i.e., G1(0) = 0.
4. Find the objective value by calculating the following three moments:
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(a) For each consumer in KHPS, calculate the average choice probabilities for each
product given the parameters value, i.e.,
q^ij =
1
ns
nsX
k=1
qijk
which is the approximated choice probabilities of product j for each household
i. It is straightforward to calculate the moment conditions G2() and G3().
(b) Because of the household heterogeneity, we need to approximate  by
km =
1
nM
nMX
i=1
@qik
@pm
Given this , we can compute the inverse matrix, which enables us to obtain
the rms' rst order conditions, i.e., G4().
5. Go back to step 2, until the objective function is minimized.
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